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Adopting the interpretative/hermeneutical method typical of much legal scholarship,
this article considers two sets of issues pertaining to LTDNA profiles as evidence in
criminal proceedings. The section titled Expert Evidence as Forensic Epistemic Warrant
addresses some rather large questions about the epistemic status and probative value
of expert testimony in general. It sketches a theoretical model of expert evidence,
highlighting five essential criteria: (1) expert competence; (2) disciplinary domain; (3)
methodological validity; (4) materiality; and (5) legal admissibility. This generic model
of expert authority, highlighting law’s fundamentally normative character, applies to all
modern forms of criminal adjudication, across Europe and farther afield. The section
titled LTDNA Evidence in UK Criminal Trials then examines English and Northern Irish
courts’ attempts to get to grips with LTDNA evidence in recent cases. Better appreciating
the ways in which UK courts have addressed the challenges of LTDNA evidence
may offer some insights into parallel developments in other legal systems. Appellate
court rulings follow a predictable judicial logic, which might usefully be studied and
reflected upon by any forensic scientist or statistician seeking to operate effectively
in criminal proceedings. Whilst each legal jurisdiction has its own unique blend of
jurisprudence, institutions, cultures and historical traditions, there is considerable scope
for comparative analysis and cross-jurisdictional borrowing and instruction. In the spirit
of promoting more nuanced and sophisticated international interdisciplinary dialogue,
this article examines UK judicial approaches to LTDNA evidence and begins to elucidate
their underlying institutional logic. Legal argument and broader policy debates are not
confined to considerations of scientific validity, contamination risks and evidential integrity,
or associated judgments of legal admissibility or exclusion. They also crucially concern
the manner in which LTDNA profiling results are presented and explained to factfinders
in criminal trials.
Keywords: expert evidence, criminal adjudication, LTDNA profiling evidence, comparative criminal procedure,
Law-Science, interdisciplinarity
Roberts LTDNA Evidence on Trial
INTRODUCTION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
TOPIC OF CONVERSATION
As originally conceived, this Research Topic focused on “the
interface between forensic scientists and statisticians when
calculating likelihood ratios for low template and complex
DNA results”1. The problem of calculating and interpreting
likelihood ratios was thereby implicitly characterized as a bilateral
conversation between statisticians and forensic scientists. Of
course, on further reflection, there is self-evidently a third
major conversation partner in this discussion, namely courts
and legal professionals. We might add that criminal “courts”
in jurisdictions such as England and Wales comprise a mixture
of professional judges and lay fact-finders, though jurists and
jurors alike are laypeople when it comes to DNA profiling
science. Our Topic Editors observed that “[t]here is a danger
for courts if [likelihood ratios] are produced by a black box
where the reporting forensic scientist has little input into
and less understanding” of statistical methods. The clear (and
unsurprising) presupposition is that difficulties associated with
Low Template DNA (LTDNA) evidence cannot simply be
conceptualized as “technical” questions to be resolved between
specialists according to mutually satisfactory methodological
criteria. There remains the challenge of communicating the
meaning and significance of technical fixes to lay audiences
in criminal adjudication. This communicative dimension is a
general feature of expert testimony, whether or not it concerns
anything properly categorized as “science”2.
This article considers two sets of issues pertaining to LTDNA
profiles as evidence in criminal proceedings, which are pertinent
to all modern legal systems in which this type of evidence is
currently or might in future be adduced. The section titled Expert
Evidence as Forensic Epistemic Warrant addresses some rather
large questions about the epistemic status and probative value of
expert testimony in general. The following section on LTDNA
Evidence in UK Criminal Trials then examines English courts’
attempts to get to grips with LTDNA evidence in recent cases.
These efforts might or might not appear impressive to outsiders,
but they do, generally speaking, follow a predictable judicial
logic—a logic which might usefully be studied and reflected
upon by any forensic scientist or statistician seeking to operate
effectively in this system of justice. In the spirit of promoting
more nuanced and sophisticated interdisciplinary dialogue this
article examines judicial approaches to LTDNA evidence and
begins to elucidate their underlying institutional logic.
The following discussion adopts the interpretative or
hermeneutical method typical of much legal scholarship.
1This was the title of the Research Topic originally announced on the Frontiers
website, and in my invitation to contribute to it, and was still the current version
when I first submitted this paper (11 March 2016). Now see Sue Pope and
Alex Biedermann, “Research Topic: The Dialogue Between Forensic Scientists,
Statisticians and Lawyers about Complex Scientific Issues for Court,” Frontiers,
http://journal.frontiersin.org/researchtopic/4000/the-dialogue-between-forensic-
scientists-statisticians-and-lawyers-about-complex-scientific-issues-f (accessed 17
May 2016).
2Generally, see Paul Roberts (ed.), Expert Evidence and Scientific Proof in Criminal
Trials (Ashgate, 2014).
It engages with primary and secondary institutional materials—
prominently featuring reported criminal appeals in England
and Wales—in an attempt both to understand judicial practice
and to contribute to the best normative (re)interpretation of
legal doctrine and institutions. It might fairly be conceptualized,
in methodological terms, as an elucidation of the internal
logics of legal argumentation and judicial reasoning, which are
often opaque to non-lawyers, even to those such as forensic
scientists who regularly participate in criminal investigations
and are no strangers to courtrooms. In striking contrast to
scientific knowledge, law is delimited by jurisdiction. The
second half of this article discusses appellate decisions drawn
from two specific, common law jurisdictions: Northern Ireland
(applying Northern Ireland law), and England and Wales
(applying English law). Whilst each legal jurisdiction has its
own unique blend of jurisprudence, institutions, cultures, and
historical traditions, there is considerable scope for comparative
analysis and cross-jurisdictional borrowing and instruction, the
more so in a shrinking world characterized by globalization
and cosmopolitan legality. Better appreciating the ways in
which UK courts have addressed the challenges of LTDNA
evidence may offer some insights into parallel developments in
other legal systems. Moreover, the practical challenges posed
by forensic science and other expert witness testimony cut
across conventional Comparative Law distinctions between
“adversarial” and “inquisitorial” procedures or “common law”
and “civilian” legal systems. In setting the scene for more detailed
doctrinal analysis, the first part of this article presents a generic
model of expert authority highlighting law’s fundamentally
normative mission which applies to all modern forms of criminal
adjudication, across Europe and farther afield.
EXPERT EVIDENCE AS FORENSIC
EPISTEMIC WARRANT
Criminal trials are practical exercises in reasoning under
uncertainty. We want to know what happened; but material
facts are contested (otherwise the accused would have pleaded
guilty in common law systems). Relevant evidence rationally
authorizes or “warrants” particular inferential conclusions. The
more probative value evidence has, the more warrant it provides
for the conclusion. In traditional common law thinking, the best
evidence is the oral testimony of a percipient witness, given on
oath, and tested through cross-examination. This category of
evidence is regarded as providing the best epistemic warrant for
the inferential conclusions supported by the witness’s testimony.
This doesn’t mean to say, of course, that every witness in court is
truthful, accurate and reliable. We know, for example, that there
can be many kinds of difficulty with eyewitness testimony3. But it
does not follow, as a general proposition, that we should therefore
prefer the testimony of those who did not see the incident
to testimony from witnesses who did. “Best” does not mean
infallible. Evidence adduced in criminal trials is often contested
3See e.g., Richard A. Wise, Clifford S. Fishman and Martin A. Safer, “How to
Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case” (2009) 42
Connecticut Law Review 435.
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or contradictory, and the factfinder must make the best of it,
resolving any enduring doubts in accordance with the applicable
burden and standard of proof. In criminal litigation, most (not
all) doubts are resolved in favor of the accused, in accordance
with the presumption of innocence4.
Expert evidence supplies inferential warrant through the
argument from authority. The expert says to the court, trust
me, I’m an expert. The authority paradigm underpinning the
inferential logic of forensic expert testimony has five major
components: (1) the expert is a genuine expert (competence);
(2) in a field in which expertise can be obtained (domain); (3)
and has correctly and conscientiously applied authentic domain-
specific protocols to produce proffered evidence (methodological
validity); (4) in relation to a legally relevant issue (materiality);
(5) and in a form that is likely to provide legitimate epistemic
warrant for legal adjudication (admissibility). The authority
paradigm is generic. It applies to “sciences” as conventionally
understood (and in idiomatic English, this generally means
“the hard sciences” like physics and chemistry), but also to
historical, social and psychological facts, and even to moral
and theological reasoning. This 5-fold taxonomy, albeit a
necessarily simplifying model, offers a powerful heuristic for
teasing out theoretical complexities and practical challenges
entailed by the familiar-sounding notion of forensic expertise5.
For example, components (1) to (3)—competence, domain
and methodological validity—interact in interesting ways. The
authority paradigm obviously breaks down if the testimony is
not proffered by a genuine expert; if the so-called expert is
an “incompetent” witness in the common lawyer’s sense. But
sometimes, it is not so much the qualifications and experience
of individual experts that are at stake, but the very possibility
of domain expertise. The objection to “expert” witch-finders6
or ghost hunters is more fundamental (and less ad hominem)
than any criticism that individual exponents have not taken
the appropriate training courses or gained enough job-related
experience.
Methodological validity, component (3), embraces a set of
important epistemic considerations arising even in relation to
genuine experts in well-established disciplinary domains. The
authority paradigm breaks down for different reasons when
genuine experts succumb to personal or professional biases,
fail to implement pertinent methodological protocols correctly,
or purport to speak beyond the boundaries of their domain-
specific expertise. It may be difficult in the general run of cases
for courts to differentiate between genuinely well-credentialed
4The leading case in English law is (still) Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462,
HL. However, the concept of “presumption of innocence” is complex and open
to a range of normative and epistemic interpretations. See further, Paul Roberts,
“Loss of Innocence in Common Law Presumptions” (2014) 8 Criminal Law and
Philosophy 317.
5Also see Susan Haack, Evidence Matters: Science, Proof and Truth in the Law
(Cambridge UP, 2014); Harry Collins, Are We All Scientific Experts Now? (Polity,
2014); Harry Collins and Robert Evans, Rethinking Expertise (Chicago UP, 2007).
6For pertinent historical context, see Malcolm Gaskill, “Witchcraft and Evidence
in Early Modern England” (2008) 198 Past and Present 33; Gregory Durston,
Witchcraft and Witch Trials: A History of English Witchcraft and its Legal
Perspectives, 1542 to 1736 (Barry Rose, 2000).
experts, and plausible-sounding charlatans and shysters7. This
practical challenge is so much greater, however, in relation to the
types of failing encompassed by component (3), where genuine
experts are over-reaching in one way or another8. Forms of expert
testimony incorporating multiple specialist domains, including
DNA profiling, pose such dilemmas acutely. Plainly, not every
opinion or judgment expressed by an expert properly qualifies
as expert opinion. Judges may be ill-equipped and trial procedure
ill-suited to policing experts’ disciplinary boundaries effectively.
Components (4) and (5) of the authority paradigm—
materiality and admissibility—introduce further major
complexities, in terms of managing the interface between expert
knowledge and forensic objectives, concerns and values. A vital
distinction is that, whereas components (1)–(3) are essentially
epistemic matters, criminal adjudication is fundamentally
normative. The overriding objective of criminal proceedings
is doing justice;9 and whilst epistemic considerations are vital
ingredients in the mix—we want to convict the guilty, and only
them, of the right offence(s)—epistemology is not the proof of
the pudding. We only want to convict the guilty in the right way
(“by due process of law”), not any which way—e.g., by vigilante
lynch mob or Dirty Harry policing10 in violation of the rule of
law. Thus, all evidence, including expert witness testimony, must
satisfy fundamental criteria of procedural fairness, transparency,
exposure to adversarial testing, and compliance with other
basic criteria of the right to a fair trial. Notwithstanding their
divergent legal histories, idiosyncratic procedural traditions
and distinctive institutional cultures, all 47 Council of Europe
nations are bound by a common conception of the fundamental
requirements of fair criminal trials under Article 6 of the ECHR11
(which is entirely separate from parallel or overlapping EU legal
frameworks applicable only to the 28 countries of the “smaller
Europe”12).
7Although in no sense representative, the literature contains examples of truly
egregious malpractice in pockets of forensics: see e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, “The
Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime
Laboratories” (1997) 4 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 439.
8Cf. Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462, [2006] EWCA Civ 1390;
Richard Nobles and David Schiff, “Misleading Statistics within Criminal Trials –
The Sally Clark Case” (2005) 2(1) Significance 17.
9This is now an explicit normative requirement in English law: Criminal
Procedure Rules 2015, r.1. For broader contextualizing discussion, see Paul
Roberts, “Groundwork for a Jurisprudence of Criminal Procedure” in R. A. Duff
and Stuart Green (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP, 2011).
10For idiomatic applications across the political spectrum, see e.g., Russell
Dean Covey, “Miranda and the Media: Tracing the Cultural Evolution of a
Constitutional Revolution” (2007) 10 Chapman Law Review 761; Joëlle Anne
Moreno, “What Happens when Dirty Harry Becomes an (Expert) Witness for the
Prosecution?” (2004) 79 Tulane Law Review 1; Richard Nobles and David Schiff,
“Due Process andDirty Harry Dilemmas: Criminal Appeals and the Human Rights
Act” (2001) 64Modern Law Review 911; Michael Stokes Paulsen, “Dirty Harry and
the Real Constitution” (1997) 64 University of Chicago Law Review 1457; Carl B.
Klockars, “The Dirty Harry Problem” (1980) 452 Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 33.
11For general elucidation, see John D. Jackson and Sarah J. Summers, The
Internationalization of Criminal Evidence (CUP, 2012); Paul Roberts and Jill
Hunter (eds.), Criminal Evidence and Human Rights (Hart, 2012).
12Cf. Paul Roberts, “From Extradition to Surrender: EU Criminal Law and
Comparative Legal Method” (2014) 53 Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 545;
Jacqueline Hodgson, “EU Criminal Justice: The Challenge of Due Process Rights
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It is at this point in the discussion that, in my experience,
lawyers and scientists tend to see things differently; and
misunderstandings easily arise. Science investigates empirical
matters, and produces factual information about the world. It
is epistemic to its core and overwhelmingly instrumental in
outlook. The policy paradigm is “curing cancer.” A new drug
either works (in part), or it does not. It has particular side-
effects (in some degree), or it does not. It can be manufactured
by a particular process, or it cannot. Likewise, the DNA
collected from the crime scene was either deposited by the
accused, or by somebody else; the accused lacked capacity
to form the required intention at the material time (e.g.,
because catatonic or sleepwalking), or he did not; and so
on. These are all facts about the (empirical) world; they are
either true or false; and they invoke or presuppose causal
explanations. This is not to say or imply that “science”
always provides unequivocal, certain answers to discrete, well-
formulated questions. To the contrary, scientific investigation
is inherently uncertain (“experimental”), and conclusions
are typically framed in probabilistic terms—whether or not
employing explicitly quantitativemeasurements of uncertainty in
numbers or words. But the equivocation introduced by resorting
to probability is epistemic not ontological: it relates to the status of
our knowledge and beliefs about facts in the world, not to the facts
themselves (setting aside complications arising from quantum
physics and sub-atomic particles not pertinent to the present
discussion). Judgments of justice are of an entirely different,
normative, order. It is not merely doubtful or uncertain whether,
say, it would be just or fair if Drug X cured cancer; or just
or fair if the accused were the donor of crime scene DNA.
Such questions are incoherent. They perpetrate a category error,
confusing normative standards with empirical facts.
Criminal adjudication comprises a set of institutionalized
practices for determining liability and censuring and punishing
criminal wrongdoing13. This set of practices is normative
through and through. It is not just that epistemic considerations
are subject to normative side-constraints, as where we exclude
relevant evidence procured by torture irrespective of its epistemic
credentials14. Epistemic objectives are themselves normatively
constituted, in the sense that the standard of adequate epistemic
warrant is indexed to the institutionalized practices and
objectives of criminal adjudication. So what we require is
not “adequate warrant” (sufficient grounds) in the abstract,
but adequate warrant for the purposes of determining criminal
liability and censuring and punishing criminal wrongdoers. By
reframing the issue in this way, it should become clearer why
expert evidence cannot provide its own epistemic warrant for
judicial purposes, no matter how highly the evidence scores on
components (1)–(3) of the authority paradigm. Expert witnesses
within a Framework of Mutual Recognition” (2011) 37 North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation 308.
13Generally, see Paul Roberts (ed.), Theoretical Foundations of Criminal Trial
Procedure (Ashgate, 2014).
14A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2006] 2 AC 221,
[2005] UKHL 71; Gäfgen v Germany (2011) 52 EHRR 1, ECtHR (GC). For
discussion, see Paul Roberts, “Normative Evolution in Evidentiary Exclusion:
Coercion, Deception and the Right to a Fair Trial” in Paul Roberts and Jill Hunter
(eds.), Criminal Evidence and Human Rights (Hart, 2012).
do not decide what evidence is “good enough” for the purposes
of criminal adjudication. This is the role of the legally, indeed
constitutionally, authorized fact-finder. Furthermore, issues of
materiality and strategic application in individual cases are
determined by legal standards and judicial decision-makers, not
by the disciplinary standards embraced by particular sciences or
expert witnesses. This insight goes to the heart of the truism that
forensic science serves justice, not the other way around.
The logic of the authority paradigm and the priority of
normative over epistemic considerations in criminal adjudication
are general features of all modern legal systems. However, the
ways in which resulting interfaces are organized, opportunities
exploited, and tensions managed vary considerably from one
legal system to the next, working with the grain of local
procedural traditions, institutional practices and professional
cultures. For example, in the common law world lay fact-
finding is still regarded as significant (even though professional
judges increasingly predominate), whilst lay input in criminal
adjudication is diminished or even non-existent in most
Continental juristic traditions. The roles, relationships, and
distribution of powers between judges, prosecutors and defence
lawyers also vary considerably across legal jurisdictions. In
legal systems with stronger adversarial leanings, prosecutors and
defence lawyers tend to play a more active role in shaping the
course of the proceedings, whereas the “inquisitorial” judge is the
dominant figure in other procedural models. Criminal procedure
is dynamic and constantly evolving (we have seen major shifts
toward a philosophy of activist judicial trial management in
England and Wales in recent years, for example), and it is
always perilous to over-generalize abstract formal models or to
extrapolate too confidently from national traditions. It follows
that approaches to expert evidence in general, or to particular
types of scientific evidence such as LTDNA, which are utilized
successfully in one jurisdiction cannot automatically be expected
to operate with the same success, or at all, in a different
procedural environment structured by alternative normative
priorities. This observation holds irrespective of the epistemic
credentials of expert evidence, encapsulated in authority paradigm
components (1)–(3). Normative pluralism and jurisdictional
diversity are inherent features of modern legality requiring
detailed local knowledge and careful negotiation, not least on
the part of expert witnesses operating in multiple jurisdictions.
However, these elements of cultural relativity tend to provoke
intuitive resistance form scientists accustomed to prioritizing
universal (empirical) scientific truth over national ideology. In
one sense, skepticism is justified: sacrificing science to ideology
in general, and regardless of political variety, leads to Lysenkoism,
authoritarianism, crop failure and mass starvation. Nonetheless,
the subservience of science to normative criteria is an inherent,
fully rationalized and legitimate requirement of penal justice.
Two kinds of recurrent problems with expert evidence call
for practical solutions in all legal systems. The first is the
problem of expert disagreement; the second, more fundamental
problem concerns a recurrent dynamic between deference and
education in reliance on expertise. What should a court do
when expert witnesses disagree? An attractive first option would
be to find that, on further investigation, there is no genuine
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disagreement to resolve, e.g., because one of the protagonists
is not really an expert after all, or not an expert in the
relevant domain, or because the experts have been fed different
factual assumptions by their instructing lawyers, and once these
discrepancies have been clarified the ostensible disagreement
disappears. But this convenient resolution will not always
be possible. In cases of genuine, well-informed, unshakeable
disagreement between experts, various strategies are available to
the court. One approach would be to accept the disagreement
as a forensically significant fact in and of itself and resolve
the issue in accordance with the burden and standard of proof
(usually, but not invariably, giving the accused the benefit
of the doubt in a criminal trial)15. A second strategy would
be to side-step scientific disagreements by invoking individual
experts’ respective qualifications, experience and/or testimonial
credibility as proxies for the reliability of their evidence, e.g.,
by adopting the working assumption that the professor or
consultant is more likely to be correct than a laboratory
technician or medical student. A third possibility is for the court
to try to resolve the disagreement for itself. Strategies two and
three exemplify the education/deference dynamic in factfinders’
reliance on expert evidence. Strategy two entails deferring to
the most authoritative expert, as judged by the factfinder (with
or without the benefit of further judicial directions). The third
strategy initially sounds the most attractive, because it comports
with the factfinder’s overarching responsibility for determining
disputed questions of fact. The obvious problem is that, by
definition, the factfinder lacks domain-specific expertise. Can the
experts, through their courtroom testimony, effectively educate
the factfinder to arrive at its own decision? Perhaps some
element of “education” is possible, even in the constrained and
most unpromising pedagogical environment of the criminal
courtroom, but it seems quite implausible that factfinders in
criminal trials could be equipped with sufficient knowledge and
insight to resolve disputes between genuine experts with long
years of study and extensive practical experience under their
belts16. Worse, fact-finders’ lack of domain-relevant expertise
also undercuts strategy two, because how is it possible for jurors
to assess the comparative merits of experts’ disagreements when
their own knowledge of the field is tenuous or non-existent? The
worry is that, in the absence of rational criteria for making a
determination, factfinders will fall back on irrational proxies for
robust epistemic warrant, such as placing their faith in the expert
15This strategy was suggested in R v Cannings [2004] 1 WLR 2607, [178] (CA),
where Judge LJ advised prosecutors and trial judges that “if the outcome of the
trial depends exclusively or almost exclusively on a serious disagreement between
distinguished and reputable experts, it will often be unwise, and therefore unsafe,
to proceed.” But cf. R v Hookway and Noakes [2011] EWCA Crim 1989.
16These issues are well-debated in the legal literature: see further, Ronald J. Allen,
“Expertise and the Daubert Decision” (1994) 84 Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 1157; Edward J. Imwinkelreid, “The Next Step in Conceptualizing
the Presentation of Expert Evidence as Education: the Case for Didactic
Trial Procedures” (1997) 1 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 128;
Gary Edmond, “The Next Step or Moonwalking? Expert Evidence, the Public
Understanding of Science and the Case Against Imwinkelreid’s Didactic Trial
Procedures” (1998) 2 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 13; Imwinkelreid,
“Correspondence: Didactic Trial Procedures” (1998) 2 International Journal of
Evidence and Proof 205.
with greater testimonial eloquence or the doctor with the most
reassuring bedside manner.
Legal systems resolve these pervasive issues of expertise
in their own distinctive ways. At the level of sweeping
generalization, common lawyers tend to think that “civilians
don’t try”17 and that inquisitorial judges too readily defer
to authoritative court-appointed experts18. Civilians, for their
part, tend to regard common law criminal procedure as
irrational in its preferences for adversarial theatre, excessive
technicality and lay over expert (including expert judicial)
decision-making19. These longstanding debates implicate deep-
rooted and enduring controversies, which it would not be
profitable to dig into here; save to say that there is no reason
for thinking that structures and cultures of criminal adjudication
must conform to a single uniform pattern (so long as they
adhere to fundamental standards of justice), any more than
we should expect rigid, monotonous uniformity in national
cuisine, manners or language. Recognition of legitimate scope for
national cultural diversity, even in procedural fundamentals, is
another major respect in which international, interdisciplinary
conversations about law and justice differ markedly from
international conversations about science and expertise.
LTDNA EVIDENCE IN UK CRIMINAL
TRIALS
Recent attempts by criminal courts in England and Wales and
Northern Ireland to get to grips with LTDNA profiling evidence
must be interpreted in light of the conceptual, normative and
juridical considerations summarized in the previous section. The
five principal components of the authority paradigm and the
diversity of national criminal procedures within a shared ECHR
framework mandating fair trials, in particular, need to be borne
in mind as the exposition unfolds. Just as the entirety of western
philosophy has evolved in productive antagonism with skeptical
doubt, legal recognition of LTDNA profiling was propelled by
challenges to its methodology, epistemic status and evidential
reliability. The evolution of English criminal jurisprudence
on LTDNA profiling may find some resonances with parallel
developments in other legal jurisdictions, and possibly inform
17William Twining, “Civilians Don’t Try: A Comment on Mirjan Damaska’s
“Rational and Irrational Proof Revisited”” (1997) 5 Cardozo Journal of
International and Comparative Law 69.
18MN Howard QC, “The Neutral Expert: A Plausible Threat to Justice” [1991]
Criminal Law Review 98. Such stereotypes are not without empirical foundation:
cf. Chrisje Brants, “Wrongful Convictions and Inquisitorial Process: the Case of the
Netherlands” (2012) 80University of Cincinnati Law Review 1069, 1111 (observing
that, “[j]udges may be inclined to give too much weight to expert testimony and
forensic evidence (especially true of DNA).... [I]t is perhaps more problematic that
judges will generally have at their disposal the evidence of only one expert.... [T]he
routine absence of an expert for the defence means that the court is dependent
upon its own, often amateur, evaluation of the evidence”).
19See further, J. R. Spencer, “Court Experts and Expert Witnesses: Have We a
Lesson to Learn from the French?” (1992) 45 Current Legal Problems 213; William
T. Pizzi, Trials Without Truth (NYU Press, 1999); Gordon van Kessel, “Adversary
Excesses in the American Criminal Trial” (1992) 67 Notre Dame Law Review
403; Mirjan R Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative
Approach to the Legal Process (Yale UP, 1986).
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legal argument and policy debates in criminal trials and appeals
elsewhere.
(a) Legal Recognition
Our story begins in 2007 with the judgment of the Northern
Ireland Crown Court in R v Hoey20, in which Weir J, sitting
without a jury in a “Diplock” trial court21, commented on the
reliability of what was then generally referred to as Low Copy
Number (LCN) DNA profiling evidence. LCN profiling evidence
in this case, generated by the Forensic Science Service (FSS)
laboratory in Birmingham22, purported to link the accused to
explosive devices used in a string of terrorist bombings across
Northern Ireland, including “the infamous car bomb explosion
that destroyed much of the shopping Centre of Omagh on
the afternoon of Saturday, 15 August 1998 with... appalling
consequence[s]... leaving permanent and widespread physical
and psychological scars.”23 During the course of the trial, serious
concerns were identified regarding the integrity of the evidential
samples collected from crime scenes, which had not initially
been taken, handled or stored with DNA profiling in mind.
The Court found that “the arrangements within the police in
1998 and 1999 for the recording and storage of items were
thoroughly disorganized”24 and that “thoughtless and slapdash”
exhibit handling and anti-contamination practices extended
to the laboratories and staff of Forensic Service Northern
Ireland (FSNI)25. Mr. Justice Weir considered it “extraordinary”
that “knowing that these items had not been collected or
preserved using methods designed to ensure the high degree
of integrity needed not merely for DNA examination but for
the more exacting requirements of LCN DNA, examinations
were performed at Birmingham with a view to using them for
evidential rather than solely intelligence gathering purposes.” Yet
analytical results fromDNA profiling had then been “put forward
and stoutly defended” at trial “as evidence that the Court might
safely rely upon as tending to establish the guilt of the accused.”26
As a matter of legal logic, Weir J’s decisive conclusion flowed
almost ineluctably from the prosecution’s failure to establish the
integrity of its evidence:
[O]ne police and SOCO witness after another and also Dr. Griffin
[of FSNI] had candidly made clear that possible examination
for DNA was not in their minds at all as they were collecting,
storing, transmitting and dealing with these items in 1998. Why
therefore would they then have had present to their minds and
been complying with the exacting integrity requirements which
reliable DNA examination and most especially that in its LCN
form demands? All this [FSNI] must have known very well when
20R v Sean Hoey [2007] NICC 49.
21See John Jackson and Sean Doran, Judge Without Jury: Diplock Trials in the
Adversary System (OUP, 1995).
22The FSS was subsequently, and controversially, closed down to save public
money: see House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Forensic
Science, Second Report of Session 2013–14, HC 610 (TSO, 2013).
23R v Sean Hoey [2007] NICC 49, [1].
24Ibid [51].
25“The position so far as [FSNI] is concerned is even more difficult to comprehend
as everyone there must have been very well aware of the risks of improper labeling,
storage and examination”: Ibid [59].
26Ibid [60].
it co-operated in searching for and collecting items for LCN
examination in Birmingham and again later when the idea of
using the results of those examinations as evidence in this trial
must have been under discussion. By that stage the problems
inherent in the need to prove integrity had plainly come to
be appreciated by one or more police officers concerned in
this investigation as was shown by the mendacious attempts to
retrospectively alter... evidence so as to falsely make it appear that
appropriate DNA protective precautions had been taken at that
scene.... [H]aving carefully reviewed all the evidence on this issue,
I am not in the least satisfied in relation to any one of the items
upon which reliance is sought to be placed for the results of their
LCN DNA examinations that the integrity of any of those items
prior to its examination for that purpose has been established
by the evidence. Accordingly I find that that DNA evidence...
cannot satisfyme either beyond a reasonable doubt or to any other
acceptable standard27.
That is to say, in terms of the conceptual framework sketched
in the previous section, the DNA profiling evidence lacked
adequate epistemic warrant for grounding a criminal conviction,
owing to the well-established fact that forensic samples were
compromised—at least in the sense that their integrity could not
be demonstrably assured.
Weir J’s judgment might have stopped there, but instead
briefly addressed the validity and merits of LCN profiling
techniques themselves, since these had been extensively
canvassed during the trial and conflicting expert views had been
expressed. Weir J was “concerned at the wide variance in expert
opinions, not only as between the Prosecution and Defence but
also between the two experts called for the Prosecution,”28 as
well as by the “manner and content of the response” of the main
FSS expert to defence criticisms. This witness appeared to Weir
J to be “inappropriately combative as an expert witness and
his unwillingness to debate constructively the various matters
put to him was unhelpful in the extreme.”29 Notice that, in
the absence of domain expertise, Weir J predictably falls back
on general proxies for testimonial reliability, such as the (not
unreasonable) working assumptions that a conscientious and
objective scientist will display an open mind and be prepared
to debate criticisms and objections in a fair-minded way. A
second prosecution expert, by contrast, came over to the Court
as “willing to carefully consider the propositions put to him”
by defence counsel, such that “his evidence greatly helped to
inform and bring some objectivity to the debate.”30 Weir J
registered “concern about the present state of the validation of
the science and methodology associated with LCN DNA and, in
consequence, its reliability as an evidential tool” and expressed
himself “not satisfied that the publishing of two journal articles
describing a process invented by the authors can be regarded
without more as having “validated” that process for the purpose
of its being confidently used for evidential purposes.”31 These
27Ibid [60], [61].
28Ibid [62].
29Ibid [63].
30Ibid.
31Ibid [64]. Notice that “confident use for evidential purposes” parallels, in my
terminology, adequate epistemic warrant for (use in) criminal adjudication.
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remarks were left hanging within the context of an unresolved
broader discussion about enhancing procedural frameworks
for regulating the admission and uses of scientific evidence in
criminal trials. Weir J suggested that “the evidence given in this
case by the FSS witnesses reinforces in the clearest way possible
the need for urgent attention to this task.”32
Being a decision at first instance, R v Hoey did not create
a binding legal precedent (not even in Northern Ireland), and
Weir J’s remarks on LCN DNA profiling were strictly obiter
dicta, i.e., not part of the formal legal holding in the case. It
was nonetheless a widely reported judgment in a very high
profile trial, which sparked much agitated discussion amongst
forensic scientists and led the Association of Chief Police Officers
(ACPO), in consultation with the Crown Prosecution Service
(CPS), to recommend temporary suspension of LCN profiling
techniques in criminal investigations and prosecutions pending
further inquiry and review. The science of LTDNA analysis,
defined as “[a]n ultra-sensitive technique that has the potential
to yield a DNA profile from sub-optimal biological samples
e.g., Low Copy Number DNA analysis,”33 was subsequently
examined by an expert panel established by the Forensic Science
Regulator and chaired by Professor Brian Caddy. The Caddy
Review concluded that “the science supporting the delivery
of Low Template DNA (LTDNA) analysis is sound and that
the three companies... providing this service to the Criminal
Justice System have validated their processes in accord[ance] with
accepted scientific principles.”34 But it was noted that “regardless
of which signal enhancement method is selected, the problems
of allele drop out due to stochastic effects in the presence of low
quantities of template and that of increase[d] noise will occur
in sub-optimal DNA samples,”35 and the concerns expressed by
Weir J in Hoey regarding the absence of reliable validation were
characterized as “well-founded.”36 Furthermore:
Interpretation of the results is complex for two reasons: the
statistics are challenging and probably hard to comprehend by a
non-specialist and the decision how and when to apply certain
statistical methods has not yet reached a clear consensus... the
challenges in terms of statistical interpretation of the data and
in communicating them to a largely innumerate criminal justice
system should not be under-estimated, nor should the importance
of earning and maintaining public confidence in the system37.
These observations appropriately acknowledge the broader
institutional context and social expectations of evidential
(epistemic) warrant for criminal verdicts. The Caddy Review
recommended that “any LTDNA profile should always be
reported to the jury with the caveats: that the nature of the
original starting material is unknown; that the time at which
32Ibid.
33Brian Caddy, Graham R Taylor and Adrian M T Linacre, A Review of
Low Template DNA Analysis (2008) [1.8], www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117556/Review_of_Low_Template_DNA_1.
pdf
34Ibid, Executive Summary.
35Ibid [3.11].
36Ibid [3.15].
37Ibid [9.3], [8.1].
the DNA was transferred cannot be inferred; and that the
opportunity for secondary transfer is increased in comparison
to standard DNA profiling.”38 Crucially, Caddy expressed the
opinion that matches for LCN DNA profiling should be reported
at the sub-source, genetic level only. Consequently, it would
be “inappropriate to comment upon the cellular material from
which the DNA arose or the activity by which the DNA was
transferred.”39
A follow-up report issued by the Forensic Science Regulator
concurred that “the science underpinning the LTDNA analytical
services, as provided to the CJS [criminal justice system], is sound
and that... suppliers offering such services have properly validated
their processes. There is no flaw inherent in the process which
prevents its use within the CJS.”40 Although there remained
“key areas where improvements can be made... probably most
importantly, the interpretation of the evidence,”41 the Regulator
stressed that scope for improvement “does not mean that the
approach should not be employed within the CJS”:
As long as the scientist reporting the results of LTDNA analysis
complies with the duties and obligations placed on expert
witnesses the CJS will appreciate the nature and value of the
evidence provided42.
This was the state of play, in technical and policy circles, when
the Court of Appeal in England and Wales came to consider the
status of LTDNA evidence in criminal trials in a clutch of criminal
appeals in 2009 and 2010, beginning with R v Reed43.
(b) Authoritative Rulings
The case popularly known as Reed and Reed actually comprised
two conjoined appeals arising from separate trials, both of
which involved challenges to LCN DNA profiling evidence.
In Reed itself, genetic material was recovered from pieces of
plastic which the prosecution contended had broken off from
a knife handle employed as the murder weapon. In Garmson,
the accused was identified as the rapist from small amounts
of DNA deposited on the victim’s lips, undergarments and
tampon. Primed by Weir J’s widely reported reservations in
Hoey and the Caddy Review’s findings, the Court of Appeal—
led by Thomas LJ, who has since been promoted to Lord Chief
Justice—embarked upon a thorough reconsideration of LCN and
LTDNA profiling evidence, and directed the parties to assist
the Court, within the framework of judicially managed pre-
trial case preparation implemented by the Criminal Procedure
Rules (CrimPR) since 2005 (and regularly updated). These
exchanges produced the following fixed points of agreement: (1)
38Ibid [7.4].
39Ibid [7.5].
40Forensic Science Regulator, Response to Professor Brian Caddy’s Review of the
Science of Low Template DNA Analysis (FSR, 2008) [4.1.1].
41Ibid [4.1.2]. Also now see Peter Gill, June Guiness and Simon Iveson, The
Interpretation of DNA Evidence (Including Low-Template DNA), FSR-G-202
(Forensic Science Regulator, 2012); Roberto Puch-Solis, Paul Roberts, Susan Pope
and Colin Aitken, Assessing the Probative Value of DNA Evidence (Royal Statistical
Society, 2012), www.rss.org.uk/statsandlaw.
42Forensic Science Regulator, Response to Professor Brian Caddy’s Review of the
Science of Low Template DNA Analysis, [4.1.3].
43R v Reed and Reed; R vGarmson [2010] 1 Cr App R 23, [2009] EWCACrim 2698.
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the “standard kit” employed in DNA profiling using the SGM+
system was “designed optimally to produce a full profile on 1
ng which is the approximate equivalent of 160 human somatic
cells which typically can be visualized in a tiny blood spot”44;
(2) “[P]articularly where no identifiable body fluid is present,
the amount of DNA present may be as low as the equivalent of
that contained in one body cell. Where a sample is measured
to be less than what is required to generate a profile using the
standard SGM+ test, then Low Template DNA analysis is often
undertaken;”45 (3) “[T]he stochastic effects may be such that no
reliable profile can be generated. The FSS had found that in a
very high proportion of profiles obtained using the LCN process
the profiles were not capable of robust and reliable interpretation
because of stochastic variations.”46
Drawing on the technical data and expert opinions canvassed
before it and adduced in evidence, the Court of Appeal noted
the importance of “the stochastic threshold” at which “the
profile is unlikely to suffer from stochastic effects (such as
allelic drop out...) which prevent proper interpretation of the
alleles.”47 Below the stochastic threshold, it is, at the very least,
debateable whether analytical results can support meaningful
findings, owing to the “noise” generated by uncontrolled random
effects. The question then becomes, how much DNA is required
to meet this stochastic threshold? The Court of Appeal had heard
differing expert views, but prevailing opinion (“in the absence
of new scientific evidence”) placed it within the range 100–
200 picograms48. In the light of this (albeit, possibly temporary
and unstable) scientific consensus, the Court of Appeal in Reed
announced the following principles of admissibility:
[A] challenge to the validity of the method of analysing Low
Template DNA by the LCN process should no longer be permitted
at trials where the quantity of DNA analysed is above the
stochastic threshold of 100–200 picograms.... There may be cases
where reliance is placed on a profile obtained where the quantity
of DNA analysed is within the range of 100–200 picograms where
there is disagreement on the stochastic threshold on the present
state of the science. We would anticipate that such cases would
be rare and that, in any event, the scientific disagreement will
be resolved as the science of DNA profiling develops. If such a
case arises, expert evidence must be given as to whether in the
particular case, a reliable interpretation can be made. We would
anticipate that such evidence would be given by persons who are
expert in the science of DNA and supported by the latest research
on the subject. We would not anticipate there being any attack on
the good faith of those who sought to adduce such evidence49.
Here we see the Court of Appeal (literally) laying down the law
in relation to the admissibility of LTDNA profiling evidence.
There is no general statutory test governing the admissibility
of expert evidence in England and Wales. Admissibility is
44Ibid [39].
45Ibid [45].
46Ibid [49].
47Ibid [74].
48Ibid.
49Ibid.
governed by common law principles,50 which the courts are
both entitled and duty-bound to develop51. Strictly speaking, the
Court’s remarks about evidence under the stochastic threshold
are obiter, because the DNA evidence in both appeals in Reed
was above the threshold, and the appeals were ultimately argued
and determined on issues of transference and persistence of DNA
traces, not on the validity of profiling techniques. However, this
(technical) legal objection would predictably fail to gain judicial
traction in subsequent cases, given the institutional status and
authority of the Reed judgment. It would be perfectly evident
to experienced lawyers that a senior court was deliberately
articulating guidance to be followed in future criminal trials and
appeals, with the firm expectation of compliance.
The admissibility principles propounded by the Court of
Appeal in Reed are interesting at a number of levels. They
are animated by the strong desirability of providing clear and
reasonably determinate guidance to prosecutors, defence lawyers
and trial judges in the conduct of criminal litigation. It would
hardly be efficient to try to re-litigate the existence and calibration
of stochastic thresholds in each and every criminal trial involving
LTDNA profiling evidence, and it would—to say the least—be
highly undesirable for individual courts to be improvising their
own, quite possibly discrepant, thresholds, depending partly on
which expert witnesses happened to testify in particular trials
and how their evidence was received and assessed by individual
trial judges in admissibility determinations (and hostage to
further contingencies, including whether admissibility was, in
fact, challenged in the instant case52). The problem is that there
is no readily available institutional mechanism for establishing
“legislative facts,” such as the nature of stochastic thresholds for
LTDNA profiling evidence, in English criminal proceedings. This
is not the sort of thing that could be included in a Code of
Criminal Procedure, even if we had one (which, if one has in
mind the standard continental model, we don’t). So the Court
of Appeal is obliged to step into the void and take responsibility
for standard-setting upon itself. However, this is slippery and
even perilous territory. Can the law plausibly dictate standards of
scientific validity, even for its own juridical purposes? The Court
of Appeal is primarily concerned with adjudicating questions of
law, not fact. There is some flexibility, inasmuch as the Court
of Appeal makes classificatory choices as the arbiter of what
qualifies, in law, as “questions of fact” and “questions of law.” But
scientific facts themselves, as opposed to the legitimacy of their
50The leading case remains R v Turner [1975] 1 QB 834 (CA), elucidating a
generic test of “helpfulness”; though this must now be read through the quasi-
legislative effect of Criminal Practice Directions 2015 [2015] EWCA Crim 1567,
CPD V Evidence 19A, propounding criteria of admissibility modeled on proposals
by the Law Commission. See further, Ian Dennis, “Editorial: Tightening the Law
on Expert Evidence” [2015] Criminal Law Review 1; TonyWard, “Expert Evidence
and the Law Commission: Implementation without Legislation?” [2013] Criminal
Law Review 561.
51See Paul Roberts, “Expert Evidence and Criminal Trial Procedure” in Gerben
Bruinsma and David Weisburd (eds.), Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal
Justice (Springer, 2013) 1480–1494; Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal
Evidence (OUP, 2/e 2010) ch 11.
52“[U]nless the admissibility is challenged, the judge will admit that evidence. That
is the only pragmatic way in which it is possible to conduct trials”: R v Reed and
Reed; R v Garmson [2010] 1 Cr App R 23, [2009] EWCA Crim 2698, [113].
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forensic uses, cannot be subjected to the normative dictates of
law, on pain of reversion to ideology and Lysenkoism.
The judgment in Reed makes extensive reference to the
Caddy Review53 and the input of the Forensic Science Regulator,
reflecting a notable emergent symbiosis. Systematic reviews
of scientific issues by expert practitioners and independent
regulators will almost certainly form sounder technical
conclusions, and supply superior epistemic warrant for
legal decision-making on scientific questions, than comparable
efforts by appellate courts (even those staffed by relatively
knowledgeable and scientifically literate judges), examining the
facts of particular cases within the constrained institutional
parameters of criminal litigation. Recognizing this, the Court of
Appeal in Reed lent its judicial authority to conclusions arrived at
extra-judicially which, in the absence of the Court’s imprimatur,
would have been relegated to the marginal jurisprudential
status of supporting material for expert witness testimony. In
this mutually obliging fashion, the Court of Appeal acquires
credibility for its scientific conclusions whilst simultaneously
conferring judicial kudos on the Regulator. Yet precisely because
we are dealing with scientific facts, forensic closure cannot be
permanent or complete. What happens if prevailing scientific
opinion shifts?54 This is hardly a remote possibility in rapidly
developing fields such as DNA profiling technology (does
anybody still remember “genetic fingerprinting,” southern
blotting and autoradiographs?55). Mindful of the risk of
petrifying the law’s approach to stochastic thresholds, the Court
of Appeal inserted the rider “in the absence of new scientific
evidence” into its admissibility principles. However, this is
effectively an invitation for trial counsel to argue that they
do, indeed, have new scientific evidence at their disposal; and
it would not be entirely surprising if time spent researching
the relevant academic journals reaped forensic rewards for
enterprising trial lawyers. Conversely, if the opportunity for
challenge in the light of new evidence had been closed down, later
shifts in scientific understandings of stochastic thresholds would
have resulted in appeals against conviction on the basis of “fresh
evidence.” It is bred into common lawyers that circumstances
alter cases and that each set of facts presents its own unique,
and eminently distinguishable, characteristics. The Court of
Appeal consequently never says “never” in relation to the scope
for challenging prevailing scientific wisdom; a caution entirely
vindicated by the fact that some very longstanding practices of
53For further critical discussion, see Christopher Lawless, Forensic Science: A
Sociological Introduction (Routledge, 2016), 107–114 and further sources cited
therein. As a legal scholar, I am patently unqualified to second-guess Caddy’s
evaluation of LTDNA profiling techniques, nor do I express any view on the
matter. My analysis relates only to English courts’ use of the Caddy Review as an
authoritative source of information and public endorsement of LTDNA’s scientific
credentials.
54Cf. R vHenderson; R v Butler; R v Oyediran [2010] 2 Cr App R 24, [2010] EWCA
Crim 1269, discussed in Paul Roberts, “Fue el Bebé Sacudido? Preuba, Pericia
y Epistemologia Juridica en el Proceso Penal Inglés” in Carmen Vázquez (ed.),
Estandares de prueba y prueba cientifica (Marcial Pons, 2013).
55On the evolution of DNAprofiling techniques, seeMichael Lynch, SimonACole,
Ruth McNally and Kathleen Jordan, Truth Machine: The Contentious History of
DNA Fingerprinting (Chicago UP, 2008).
forensic science (not to mention transient enthusiasms56) have
turned out to lack sound methodological foundations, and some
(like the old “points” system for declaring fingerprint matches)
have lately been abandoned57.
The Court of Appeal’s further “anticipation” (read: directive)
that evidence pertaining to stochastic thresholds “would be
given by persons who are expert in the science of DNA and
supported by the latest research on the subject” might sound like
no more than a reiteration of common sense legal orthodoxy,
extrapolating from the competency and domain components of
the standard authority paradigm for expertise outlined in the
previous section. In fact, these loaded remarks were intended to
signal the Court’s impatience with defence testimony challenging
the validity and inferential logic of DNA profiling evidence, based
not on direct practical experience in profiling, but on generic
principles of scientific validation, methodology and inferential
logic. Of one defence expert witness, the Court of Appeal
remarked:
He gives evidence with a degree of gravitas and fluency that is
impressive and is able to explain concepts clearly. However, his
expertise on the interpretation of DNA profiles is limited, without
any relevant first hand laboratory or research experience. He is
not qualified to make a scene of crime investigation... Whilst it
is impossible to understand how he had sufficient expertise to be
able to give evidence in R v Hoey, let alone to assist in the attack
made in that case on the LCN process, he has given evidence in
so many Low Template DNA cases since then on the strength of
the observations in R v Hoey that he has acquired a degree of
experience from these cases, his discussion with others and his
reading of papers. We retain clear reservations about the extent of
his expertise in relation to DNA profiles...58
In relation to a second defence expert, the Court complained that
“his experience is of a different jurisdiction where the scientist
who gives evidence may have a narrower type of expertise and the
scope of evidence an expert can give may not be the same as the
scope in this jurisdiction.... [H]is experience was not based on the
work of a forensic scientist in this jurisdiction who attends both
the scene of the crime and supervises the laboratory work.”59
These attempts to prioritize hands-on forensic experience over
academic research and theorizing are not entirely convincing.
Given that expertise is domain-specific, careful attention needs
56Cf. R v McIlkenny (1991) 93 Cr App R 287 (CA); R v Maguire (1992) 94 Cr
App R 133 (CA); Sir John May, Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the
Convictions Arising Out of the Bomb Attacks on Guildford and Woolwich in 1974,
HC Paper 556 (1990) and HC Paper 296 (1992); Mike Redmayne, “Expert Evidence
and Scientific Disagreement” (1997) 30 UC Davis Law Reviw 1027; Clive Walker
and Russell Stockdale, “Forensic Evidence and Terrorist Trials in the United
Kingdom” (1995) 54 Cambridge Law Journal 69.
57R v Smith (Peter) [2011] 2 Cr App R 16, [2011] EWCA Crim 1296. See
further, Simon A Cole and Andrew Roberts, “Certainty, Individualization and the
Subjective Nature of Expert Fingerprint Evidence” [2012] Criminal Law Review
824; Jennifer L. Mnookin, “The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification:
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate” (2008) 7 Law, Probability and Risk 127;
Robert Epstein, “Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” is
Revealed” (2002) 75 Southern California Law Review 605.
58R v Reed and Reed; R vGarmson [2010] 1 Cr App R 23, [2009] EWCACrim 2698,
[107].
59Ibid [103].
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to be given to the grounds, parameters and content of any
particular expert’s evidence. Courts should certainly be chary
of receiving “expert” testimony about laboratory conduct and
protocols from somebody who has never worked in a laboratory.
By parity of reasoning, however, practitioners are not necessarily
good authorities on questions of policy or theory. An example
highly pertinent to the present discussion is that a geneticist could
be highly accomplished and very experienced in DNA profiling
techniques without necessarily having acquired a firm grasp of
the statistical foundations and probabilistic methods employed
in assessing likelihood ratios for complex mixtures or partial
profiles (or even, for that matter, in generating random match
probabilities for straightforward single profiles)60. Another
background consideration possibly at work here is English courts’
intuitive suspicion of expert testimony attempting to instruct
fact-finders in relation to general considerations of logic and
inferential reasoning. Such testimony is often viewed, not without
justification, as potentially trenching on the jury’s constitutional
prerogatives in fact-finding61. But the practitioner/theoretician
continuum is orthogonal to that concern; and expert competence
must always be assessed relative to domain and materiality. The
danger is that in ostentatiously rejecting one false proxy for
testimonial reliability (a witness’s gravitas and fluency), the Court
of Appeal in Reedmay have allowed itself to be gulled by another
(“local practitioners always know best”).
(c) After Reed
Lord Justice Thomas’ prediction, or pious hope, that cases
involving LTDNA profiles arguably under the stochastic
threshold “would be rare” was soon put to the test. In R v
Broughton62 an animal rights activist was convicted of planting
incendiary devices in buildings owned by two Oxford colleges.
It was common ground that the attacks were a protest against
animal experiments by university scientists. A central plank of the
prosecution’s (entirely circumstantial) case against Broughton
was an LTDNA profile derived from match stalks which had
formed part of the fuse mechanism of improvised incendiary
devices (bottles filled with petrol) used in one attack. The
amount of genetic material recovered from the crime scene was
<100 picograms. This was insufficient to generate any usable
results from standard profiling techniques. However, by running
multiple enhanced LTDNA analyses and combining their results
to produce a “cleaned up” profile, a forensic scientist was able
to identify 20 alleles shared in common with the accused. This
produced a random match probability, comparable to RMPs for
standard profiling, of <1 in 1 billion.
One argument advanced on appeal was that Reed had already
decided that profiles below the stochastic threshold range of 100–
200 picograms are inadmissible in English law. The Court of
Appeal in Broughton made short work of the faulty logic in this
submission:
60See the sources cited at n.41, above.
61This was the real issue in R v Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467 (CA); and R v Adams
(No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377 (CA).
62R v Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549.
The appellant’s submission is... founded upon amisunderstanding
of the decision in Reed & Reed. This court recognised that in the
current state of technology there is a stochastic threshold between
100 and 200 picograms above which LTDNA techniques... can
be used to obtain profiles capable of reliable interpretation.
Specifically, the court observed that above this threshold a
challenge to the validity of the method of analysing LTDNA by
the LCN process should not be permitted in the absence of new
scientific evidence. However, the court did not hold or make any
observation to the effect that below the stochastic threshold DNA
evidence is not admissible63.
The defence argument that LTDNA profiles below the stochastic
threshold are automatically inadmissible resurfaced in a second
appeal heard later in the year, involving DNA mixtures from
more than one donor, and it was once more emphatically
rejected. The Court of Appeal reiterated that “what mattered was
the quality of the minor profiles and not the quantity.... [P]rofiles
obtained from <200 picograms can be reliable. It is reliability
that is the issue, not the quantity, though plainly the quantity is
relevant... to the consideration of stochastic effects.”64
Amore promising line of attack was to challenge the profiling
evidence on its own scientific merits. The Court of Appeal
recognized that the profiles adduced in Broughton “were derived
from unquantified samples of DNA of <100 picograms and that
this raised entirely legitimate grounds for scientific dispute which
the appellant was right in testing before the judge.”65 Prevailing
scientific understanding was summarized as follows:
[T]here is now a considerable body of opinion from respected
independent scientists and the Forensic Science Regulator that
LTDNA techniques, including those used to generate the profiles
relied upon by the Crown in this case, are well understood,
have been properly validated and are accepted to be capable of
generating reliable and valuable evidence. At these very low levels
of DNA, the dangers presented by the possibility of stochastic
effects, including allelic drop-out, drop-in and stutter are very real
and must be fully appreciated, but they may often be addressed by
repeating the process a number of times...66
Observe, again, the instrumental role of the Forensic Science
Regulator in authenticating the underpinning science and
validation processes. If—and for as long as—the Regulator is
satisfied on these technical questions, the courts are likely to
follow her67 lead. Having noted the potential shortcomings of
LTDNA profiles, however, the Court of Appeal was satisfied that
the pertinent issues had been fully ventilated in the trial and
that the evidence actually generated and adduced in the instant
case had been properly explained and vindicated by competent
experts:
63Ibid [31].
64R v C [2010] EWCA Crim 2578, [24], [27].
65R v Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549, [37].
66Ibid [34].
67The present incumbent is Dr Gillian Tully: “Appointment of New Forensic
Science Regulator Announced,” Home Office Press Release, 17 July 2014. Her
predecessor, in post when Broughton was decided, was Andrew Rennison.
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[A]ll of the consensus alleles match those in the appellant’s
profile. In other words, the consensus profiles do not suggest the
procedures suffered from drop-in or stutter such as to render
the results inherently unreliable. Indeed, this is reflected in the
statistics [sic] derived from the consensus profiles to which we
have referred and about which there was no dispute. At their most
powerful andwhen derived from all duplicated components, these
give rise to the match probability of <1 in 1 billion. We believe
that these were all matters properly admitted in evidence68.
It is important to appreciate that criminal appeals in England and
Wales are not re-trials, as they are in many continental European
jurisdictions. The Court of Appeal in England and Wales
performs an essentially reviewing function, and is primarily
concerned with the legality and fairness of trial proceedings,
not with the accuracy of their outcomes. Crucially, the Court
of Appeal does not second-guess jury verdicts. Once the Court
in Broughton had satisfied itself that the trial judge had adopted
the correct approach to assessing the admissibility of LTDNA
evidence, that question was settled for the purposes of this appeal.
But the Court still had something it wanted to get off its chest, and
the Judgment had a sting in the tail.
The Court signaled a general concern about defence tactics in
challenging the credibility and “integrity” of experts presenting
DNA profiling evidence:
Whatever may be the position in other jurisdictions, it is the duty
of an advocate and an expert in this jurisdiction not to embark
upon an attack on the integrity of other experts unless there is
an evidential basis for doing so. There was none in this case. The
attack made on the integrity of LGC Forensics and Cellmark was
without foundation and should never have been made... [T]here
can well be a difference of opinion between experts on LTDNA,
but there should be no question of the good faith of those involved
in LTDNA being put in issue. This is a case where there is a
proper disagreement between experts but the course taken by
those giving evidence on behalf of the appellant went into matters
for which there was no foundation. Not only was the attack
on the good faith of the Crown’s witness wholly deplorable and
unwarranted, but it also was a great disservice to the appellant’s
case69.
The Court is here saying that not only are such credibility attacks
contrary to ethical standards of advocacy, and therefore liable
to get counsel into hot water with their professional regulator70,
but also likely to back-fire by harming the defendant’s prospects
in the instant case. The threat is clear, but whether advocates
will pay any attention to it, less so. In Broughton, specifically,
“an attack was made... on the integrity of LGC Forensics; it was
alleged that their commercial interests and influence over their
case workers had tainted their professionalism and objectivity.
LGC Forensics were underestimating the problems which were
associated with LTDNA and promoting its viability for financial
68R v Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549, [37]. Note that RMPs are not themselves
“statistics,” but rather probabilistic extrapolations from allele frequency statistics
sampled from reference populations.
69Ibid [38].
70The Bar Council and Bar Standards Board for barristers; the Law Society and
Solicitors Regulation Authority for solicitor-advocates.
reasons.”71 Counsel presumably thought it legitimate to draw
the jury’s attention to possible conflicts of interest in the
production of expert evidence, which is now an embedded
structural feature of a marketplace dominated by commercial
providers following the demise of the FSS72. The Court of
Appeal’s message is that unfocused and entirely unsubstantiated
insinuations of commercial corruption will not be tolerated.
The situation would presumably be different if there were
material evidence that a particular expert’s objectivity or
impartiality might have been compromised by commercial
incentives. In relation to judicial impartiality, the court must
be manifestly, not merely actually, unbiased73, so that justice
is seen to be done. How much of this expectation carries
over to expert witnesses utilizing techniques from which their
employers derive a commercial advantage is a nicely balanced
question.
Once evidence has been ruled admissible, attention shifts
to its uses and probative value in the trial. An important
dimension of evidentiary regulation, and one which has been
assuming greater prominence in many common law jurisdictions
including England and Wales over the last several decades,
concerns judicial directions to the jury74. English law contains
an expanding corpus of “forensic reasoning rules”75 instructing
factfinders how they must, may or should not utilize particular
types and pieces of evidence, which inferences are rationally
available and which are legally forbidden. A number of these rules
or guidelines pertain to expert evidence in general76, and to DNA
evidence in particular77. This is where the case against Broughton
unraveled on appeal.
71R v Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549, [14].
72On structural features of “market forensics,” see Christopher J Lawless, “Policing
Markets: The Contested Shaping of Neo-Liberal Forensic Science” (2011) 51 British
Journal of Criminology 671; Paul Roberts, “What Price a Free Market in Forensic
Science Services? The Organization and Regulation of Science in the Criminal
Process” (1996) 36 British Journal of Criminology 37.
73Also now a requirement of ECHR Article 6: “According to the Court’s settled
case law, the existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6(1) must be
determined according to: (i) a subjective test, where regard must be had to the
personal conviction and behavior of a particular judge—that is, whether the judge
held any personal prejudice or bias in a given case; and (ii) an objective test, that
is to say by ascertaining whether the tribunal itself and, among other aspects,
its composition, offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in
respect of its impartiality.... What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a
democratic society must inspire in the public”: Volkov v Ukraine (2013) 57 EHRR
1, [104], [106]; Borgers v Belgium (1993) 15 EHRR 92.
74Also see Paul Roberts, Colin Aitken and Graham Jackson, “From Admissibility
to Interpretation: New Guidance on Expert Evidence” (2015) 179 Criminal Law
and Justice Weekly 538 (Part I) and 564 (Part II).
75Roberts and Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, ch 15.
76See e.g., R v Henderson [2010] 2 Cr App R 24, [2010] EWCA Crim 1269, [215]–
[220]; R v Flynn and St John [2008] 2 Cr App R 20, [2008] EWCA Crim 970;
R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31, [2004] EWCA Crim 1344, [42], [43]: “The
general principle... is that a “special warning” is necessary if experience, research
or common sense has indicated that there is a difficulty with a certain type of
evidence that requires giving the jury a warning of its dangers and the need for
caution, tailored to meet the needs of the case. This will often be the case where
jurors may be unaware of the difficulty, or may insufficiently understand it. The
strength of the warning and its terms will depend on the nature of the evidence, its
reliability or lack of it, and the potential problems it poses.”
77Notably, R v Doheny and Adams [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 (CA). In relation to
contested LTDNA profiling evidence, see R v Thomas [2011] EWCA Crim 1295.
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The trial judge in Broughton was faced with the task of
directing the jury in relation to a disagreement between the
expert witnesses regarding the possibility that the DNA sample in
questionmay have been amixed profile. The expert witness called
by the prosecution testified that she was satisfied, on the basis
of her experience, that rogue profiling results obtained during
the analytical process could be set aside as artefactual stochastic
effects. Expert evidence adduced by the defence challenged this
conclusion. It was argued that profiling results were consistent
with the presence of an unidentified donor, and since the
possibility of a mixed sample could not be ruled out, the match
probabilities quoted by the prosecution’s expert were invalid.
The trial judge in his summing-up reminded the jury of this
disagreement, which had been characterized as a legitimate
difference of opinion between genuine experts. “In other words,”
he explained, “there is no, as it were, answer at the back of the
book. There is no independent machine if people hold contrary
views to tell you in these circumstances who is right and who
is wrong. It is a question of expert evidence and scientific
judgment...”78 The judge added that, if the jury were not satisfied
by the prosecution expert’s expression of scientific judgment,
then her “statistics”79 could not be relied upon, and the jury
could not substitute its own calculations “because you are not
experts.”80 In that event, the jury would need to approach the
matter cautiously, assessing the probative value of DNA evidence
in the absence of any quantified RMP.
Readers of this scientific journal might well be thinking that
this direction was incoherent, as a DNA “match” may be close to
meaningless, or at least dangerously misleading, in the absence of
a valid RMP. The Court of Appeal thought so, too, and concluded
“with considerable regret”81 that the appeal must be allowed
and Broughton’s conviction quashed on this, relatively narrow,
ground:
[T]he judge... fell into error in directing the jury that, in those
circumstances, they could reach their own conclusions on the
DNA evidence. It is fair to say that the judge urged the jury to
exercise caution and be very careful in arriving at firm conclusions
because they were not experts in statistics. However, we believe
that only served to emphasise the void in which they were left.
They had no guidance from the experts and no guidance from the
court to enable them to conduct an evaluation of the evidence for
themselves.... [T]he judge ought to have directed the jury that if
[the prosecution’s expert] was wrong in her conclusion that the
DNA profiles were single rather than mixed, then on the only
evidence before the court at the trial the DNA evidence must be
disregarded. The judge having failed to do so, the jury may well
have embarked upon a task of evaluation for which they were not
equipped. This means their verdict cannot be regarded as safe82.
Broughton underlines the point that admissibility is not the
only important evidentiary issue raised by LTDNA profiles.
78Quoted in R v Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549, [41].
79i.e., RMP calculations, (mis)characterized by the trial judge as “the statistical
figure that has been given as a match probability”: ibid [43].
80Ibid.
81Ibid [49].
82Ibid [48], [49].
The way in which profiling evidence is communicated to lay
factfinders is also of fundamental importance if jury verdicts
are to secure adequate epistemic warrant and broader normative
legitimacy. In all other respects, the trial judge’s “admirable
summing up” in Broughton had “expertly addressed all the
evidence and the complex issues in clear terms about which
no complaint... could possibly be made.”83 A single slip
was fatal. Summing up in relation to relatively novel and
somewhat complex technologies like LTDNA profiling evidence
is evidently a minefield for trial judges. Without a firm grasp
of both the underlying science of profiling and the statistical
foundations and probabilistic logic of valid RMPs, trial judges
may inadvertently put a foot wrong, with potentially tragic
consequences.
This case history might be interpreted, especially by readers
more accustomed to inquisitorial procedures (scientists and
civilian jurists alike), as a cautionary tale about the hazards of
disaggregated tribunals in criminal adjudication and the perils
of fastidiously microscopic appellate scrutiny of the wording
of judicial directions to juries. These charges are not without
substance; but the common lawyer has this riposte. In the
absence of any parallel procedure in continental criminal trial
proceedings, wherein lies the assurance that judges have any
better understanding of the logical foundations of LTDNA
evidence and can competently assess its probative value?
Do reasoned judgments typically contain sufficiently detailed
“motivations” to enable such assessments to be made, by an
impartial observer or by the public at large? One could only
begin to answer such questions through sustained research and
on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis, but my own fragmentary
and partly anecdotal acquaintance with judicial practice in
continental Europe suggests that these are pertinent questions to
add to our shared research agenda.
CONCLUSION
Forensic DNA profiling demands cooperative interdisciplinary
expertise in forensic science, statistics and law. This article has
reviewed UK courts’ responses to LTDNA profiling, starting
with initial skepticism in R v Hoey,84 but—with the benefit
of more considered official review and expert input—quickly
producing authoritative statements endorsing admissibility.
English courts proceeded in accordance with their tried-and-
tested pragmatic method of ad hoc development of common law
tests, approaching LTDNA profiling evidence in much the same
way as DNA evidence itself was first addressed 30 years ago85.
Some loose ends left dangling by the Court of Appeal in Reed86
were tied up in Broughton, to produce the following doctrinal
83Ibid [49].
84R v Sean Hoey [2007] NICC 49.
85See e.g., R v Gordon [1995] 1 Cr App R 290 (CA). For historical discussion
going back to the first trial in which DNA profiling evidence was adduced in 1987,
see Paul Roberts, “Forensic Science and Criminal Justice” in Anthea Hucklesby
and Azrini Wahidin (eds), Criminal Justice (OUP, 2/e 2013); Peter Alldridge,
“Recognizing Novel Scientific Techniques: DNA as a Test Case” [1992] Criminal
Law Review 687.
86R v Reed and Reed; R vGarmson [2010] 1 Cr App R 23, [2009] EWCACrim 2698.
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conclusion (if it is possible to create a legal precedent in relation
to questions of fact, this is it):
[T]he science of LTDNA is sufficiently well-established to pass the
ordinary tests of reliability and relevance and it would be wrong
wholly to deprive the justice system of the benefits to be gained
from the new techniques and advances which it embodies, in cases
where there is clear evidence... that the profiles are sufficiently
reliable87.
Reliability, moreover, is primarily a function of the quality of
the profiling evidence in the instant case, as vouchsafed by
experienced experts. There is no arbitrary stochastic threshold
above which LTDNA evidence is admissible, and below which it
is automatically excluded.
There is, however, much more to be gleaned from English
jurisprudence on LTDNA profiling evidence than these
“headline” rationes decidendi (formal legal holdings). Judgments
rendered by common law courts are complex pieces of legal
literature that must be interpreted against a backdrop of “thick”
institutional practice and cultural meaning. Some of the factors
in play, including the structural logic of the argument from
authority sketched in the first part of this article and the
priority of normative over epistemic considerations in criminal
adjudication, are universal features of modern legal systems.
Other factors reflect more local dynamics pertaining to the
structural logic of criminal procedure, national legal traditions,
and broader features of culture and society (including those
features inflecting local apprehensions of adequate epistemic
warrant for criminal verdicts). The second half of the article
surveyed the principal arguments and judicial rationales that
have been deployed in English criminal appeals concerned
with LTDNA profiling evidence, pointing out their broader
institutional context and resonances and explaining why some
gained traction whilst others were rejected. The issues, we
saw, are not confined to considerations of scientific validity,
contamination risks and evidential integrity, and associated
judgments of legal admissibility or exclusion. They also crucially
concern the manner in which LTDNA profiling results are
presented and explained to lay factfinders in criminal trials.
87R v Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549, [36].
If opinions differ concerning the adequacy of English courts’
responses to LTDNA evidence, this may in part reflect divergent
understandings of the deeper structural logic and values of
criminal adjudication. These deeper structures are always
engaged, and ought to be elucidated and consciously considered,
whenever the admissibility and uses of expert evidence are placed
under the policy microscope or raise novel legal issues for
courts. Because policy questions are fundamentally normative
(within the domain of political morality) rather than factually
empirical or “scientific,” legal jurisdictions must, in the final
analysis, decide what is best for themselves, within the broad
parameters of international legal consensus on fundamental
rights and democratic values and in harmony with local juristic
traditions and cultures. But just as surely as the fact that technical
standards of DNA profiling or statistical science cannot dictate
the terms of criminal justice, modern legal systems committed to
post-Enlightenment conceptions of fact-finding and proof must
necessarily rely on the best available scientific and other technical
advice, communicated via competent, domain-specific expert
evidence, to underpin the rationality (qua epistemic warrant) of
criminal adjudication.
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